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Resumen: Evaluar la pauta cambiante de la 
política exterior de la Nueva Rusia surgida de 
las ruinas de la Unión Soviética en 1991 es un 
complejo pero interesante estudio que destaca 
cómo el Nuevo Estado ruso se ha comportado 
dentro del sistema internacional liderado por 
Occidente, así como la dinámica de las relacio-
nes internacionales que han caracterizado el 
nuevo orden mundial surgido tras la Guerra 
Fría. Siguiendo la tendencia y el patrón obser-
vable en la pujante política exterior de la Nueva 
Rusia, este artículo identifica el liberalismo y el 
nacionalismo como las principales característi-
cas de la política exterior del país. Mientras que 
en algunos momentos se mostró claramente 
prooccidental, en otras asumió una dimensión 
totalmente contraria e incluso llegó a mezclar 
ambas posturas en un intento de establecer a la 
Federación de Rusia como centro principal de 
poder en los asuntos exteriores. El documento 
concluye que este patrón visible en la política 
exterior de la Nueva Rusia fue en gran medida 
moldeado por el interés nacional y la búsqueda 
de establecer a Rusia como una superpotencia 
mundial. 
Palabras clave: Rusia; Occidente; Política exte-
rior; OTAN; Puño de hierro 
_______________________________________ 
Abstract: Assessing the changing pattern in the 
foreign policy of the New Russia that emerged 
from the ruins of the Soviet Union in 1991 is a 
complex but interesting study which highlights 
how the New Russian state has operated within 
the Western-led international system, as well as 
the dynamics of interstate relations that char-
acterised the international order that emerged 
after the Cold War era. Tracing the trend and 
observable pattern in the foreign policy thrust 
of the New Russia, the paper identified liberal-
ism and nationalism as the dual underpinning 
features of the foreign policy of the New Russia. 
While at some point it was largely pro-West, at 
another it assumed an anti-West dimension 
and, yet at another level, it blended both pos-
tures in its thrust to establishing the Russian 
Federation as a major power centre in world 
affairs. The paper concludes that the changing 
pattern observable in the foreign policy of the 
New Russia was largely shaped by national in-
terest and the quest to establishing Russia as a 
world superpower.  
Keywords: Russia; West; Foreign Policy; NATO; 
Iron fist 
_______________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
“I cannot forecast to you the action of Rus-
sia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery in-
side an enigma. But there may be a key, 
and that key is Russian national interest.” 
Winston Churchill. 
n examination of the changing pattern of 
the foreign policy of the New Russia that 
emerged from the ruins of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991 is a complex but in-
teresting study in contemporary international 
relations. It highlights the dynamics of inter-
state relations that subsequently characterise 
the international order that emerged after the 
Cold War and how the New Russia has operated 
within the Western-led international system. In 
making this assessment, however, it is impera-
tive to emphasise that the New Russia that 
A 
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emerged in the post-Soviet era was not a totali-
tarian state ruled by a Communist Party with a 
single, clearly defined foreign policy. That state 
disappeared in 1991. In the words of Michael 
McFaul, a Carnegie scholar, the New Russia is a 
democratising state, and her foreign policy 
thrust, in turn, is a product of domestic politics 
in a pluralistic system.1 This new status shapes 
the behaviour of the New Russia in world affairs 
in the post-soviet era. 
Essentially, the foreign policy thrust of the New 
Russia was largely guided by a blend of nation-
alism and pro-West policies in the immediate 
post-Cold War era and a more inclusive, aggres-
sive and competitive anti-West posture much 
later before the turn of the millennium, which 
affirms its intention to be more active and as-
sertive in international affairs, not as a mere 
participant but as a power centre in the “New 
World Order” designed and shaped by Wash-
ington and its allies. Thus, since the emergence 
of the New Russia Federation, the state has 
pursued a complex foreign policy largely influ-
enced and driven by national interests that is 
dominated by economic needs of the state. This 
pattern though necessitated a pro-Western 
stance, it assumed an anti-Western dimension 
frim about 1995, when practically the New Rus-
sia pursued as part of its foreign policy thrust an 
interest aimed at countering and revising West-
ern expansion into former Soviet space and 
Western “arrogance” in the international sys-
tem with an “iron fist” as well as to increase 
Russian influence in world politics – a foreign 
policy largely influenced and shaped by the 
personality of the leader of the Russian Federa-
tion, political parties and interest groups to an 
uncommon degree.2  
                                                          
1 
Michael McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy 
Objectives?” Testimonies before the House Commit-
tee on International Relations”, Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1 May 
1999, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/1999/04/30/what-
are-russian-foreign-policy-objectives-pub-424 (ac-
cessed 23 June 2016). 
2 
Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet 
Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. New York, 
Palgrave McMillan, 2002, 1. See also Fyodor Luky-
anov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore 
Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign Affairs, 95/3, 2016. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
russia-fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for (accessed 23 June 
Fundamentally, while the foreign policy of the 
New Russia is largely guided by a blend of con-
fidence and insecurity, this blend has evolved, 
creating another gap between the West and 
Russia, especially since the turn of the millenni-
um. While in the West, there is a broad prevail-
ing belief that Russia is in decline, emphasising 
the insecurity in the mix: 
“unreformed economically and politically 
stagnant, on the verge of major domestic 
upheaval while dependent on high oil pric-
es, Russia faces a range of challenges in a 
fast-moving and evolving international en-
vironment,”3 
Russia’s view is different. Russia considers itself 
as a re-emerging power on the rise to claim its 
proper status in world affairs. The New Russia’s 
foreign policy thrust, thus, aims at working to 
anticipate and lead events in the international 
system, to be more prominent in international 
affairs, advocating its interests, using both more 
traditional ‘hard power’ instruments as well as 
developing its international presence and using 
more ‘soft strength’ to protect and assert its 
interests.4  
The paper is divided into themes for better 
understanding of the trend and pattern observ-
able in the foreign policy pursuit of the New 
Russia and the dynamics of her engagement 
with the West in the post-Cold War era. The 
following themes are considered: the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the 
New Russia, Foreign Policy of the New Russia: 
Objectives and Perspectives, and Foreign Policy 
of the New Russia: Observable Pattern and 
Trend from 1991.    
1. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RUSSIA 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about 
a profound change in the global power balance. 
It marked the end of the rivalry that saw the 
struggle of “two systems” projected onto all 
areas of international affairs and an era marked 
                                                                                       
2016). This view was equally shared by Sergey Kara-
ganov, a Russian political scientist, in his discussion 
in 2011 of Russia’s foreign policy in the 21st Century. 
3 
Andrew Monaghan, The New Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept: Evolving Continuity. London, Chatham 
House, 2013, 7 – 8. 
4 
Ibid., 8. 
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by the threat of global war with little or no pos-
sibility for constructive international coopera-
tion.5 Historically, the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics is usually traced to 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the policies he pursued 
to reorder the Cold War relations with the West 
as well as his domestic policies to reform the 
ailing Soviet economy and agitated society. 
Gorbachev’s policies of “glasnost” and “pere-
stroika,” set in motion the chain of events that 
eventually led to the collapse of the Union.  
When Gorbachev took office in 1985 as leader 
of the Soviet Union, he chose a new Soviet path 
distinct from his predecessor’s. He sought an 
end to the Cold War with the West as a step 
towards resuscitating the ailing Soviet econo-
my. Gorbachev had ambitious plans to create a 
profoundly different relationship with the West 
and the rest of the world. This agenda, which 
the Kremlin described as “new political think-
ing,” was initially quite popular domestically 
and was well received abroad as well. However, 
as Gorbachev struggled and ultimately failed to 
restart the Soviet economy, “new political 
thinking” came to be seen as an effort to com-
pensate for, or distract attention from, rapid 
socio-economic decline by concentrating on 
foreign policy.6  
However, throughout the late 1980s, the re-
form-minded Gorbachev and his allies in gov-
ernment believed that the best way out of the 
Cold War would be to agree on new rules for 
global governance.7 In his acceptance speech as 
the new soviet leader, he outlined as part of his 
foreign policy pursuit and asserted the Soviet 
leadership valued the successes of the relaxa-
tion of international tensions achieved in the 
1970s and were ready to take part in carrying 
on with the process of establishing peaceful, 
mutually beneficial cooperation with the West. 
He emphasised, 
                                                          
5 
Melville, Andrei; Shakleina, Tatiana (eds.), Russian 
Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities. 
Budapest, Central European University Press, 2005, 
28.   
6 
Klee, Mary Beth; Cribb, John; Holdren, John (eds.), 
The Human Odyssey: From Modern Times to Our 
Contemporary Era, 3, USA, K12 Inc., 2010, 309 – 312; 
see also Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest 
to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,”. 
7 
Ibid. 
“we want termination and not continua-
tion of the arms race and, therefore, offer 
a freeze of nuclear arsenals, an end to fur-
ther deployment of missiles. We want a 
real and major reduction of the arms 
stockpiles, and not the development of ev-
er-new weapons systems, be it in space or 
on Earth.”8 
To achieve this, Gorbachev entered into deals 
with the West, mainly the United States of 
America, on the termination of the arms race, 
the reunification of Germany and the adoption 
of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe aimed 
to reduce confrontation and forge a partnership 
between the rival blocs in the East and the 
West. While these concessions eased the ten-
sion in East-West relations, relaxed internation-
al tension and assured a hopeful end to the 
Cold War, the continued deterioration of the 
soviet economy and the increasing agitation 
within the Union, especially of constituent 
states and influential movements, moved the 
Eastern superpower closer to disintegration.  
The continued deterioration of the soviet econ-
omy during the late 1980s and early ‘90s, and 
Gorbachev’s resented romance with the West 
culminated in some intriguing political manoeu-
vring and attempts at forceful hijacking power 
by coup d’état from the Communist Party. 
These events defined by the loss of confidence 
in the leadership of Gorbachev and the Com-
munist Party set the stage for the eventual dis-
integration of the Soviet Union. By December 
1991, the Soviet Union had virtually ceased to 
exist, and the future of its territories and peo-
ples uncertain. First, three republics of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania seceded from the Union, 
while the other twelve republics continued to 
strive for independence. Although attempts 
were made by Gorbachev to establish a new 
“Union of Sovereign States” with some degree 
of integration in foreign policy, defence and 
economic affairs, agreement among the re-
maining twelve republics was not achieved. In 
fact, the union republics had begun to act as 
though they were sovereign states and were 
negotiating with each other, bypassing the cen-
tral government. This process culminated on 
                                                          
8 
See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 12, 1985 availa-
ble on Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, 
WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008). 
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December 1991 in the establishment of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by 
three Slav republics of Russia, Ukraine and Bela-
rus. From this point forward, it became clear 
even to the leaders of the Union that “the 
U.S.S.R. has ceased to exist as a geopolitical 
reality.”9  
This level of deterioration was not envisaged by 
Gorbachev. Thus, this unanticipated internal 
dislocation weakened the Soviet’s position in 
the ongoing process to end the Cold War with 
the West. The dissolution of the union meant 
the exit of a superpower from the international 
arena, leaving the United States as the only 
surviving superpower to dictate the course of 
event henceforward. Gorbachev resigned as 
Soviet president on 25 December 1991, and all 
Soviet institutions ceased to function at the end 
of 1991. The main benefactor was Russia, lead-
ing state among the soviet republics. It assumed 
the U.S.S.R.'s seat on the United Nations Securi-
ty Council, and all Soviet embassies became 
Russian embassies. Thus, the New Russia 
emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union as 
the Russian Federation. The emergence, how-
ever, was nothing comparable to the political 
influence wielded by the U.S.S.R. in world af-
fairs as a superpower. The New Russia inherited 
all that was left of the Soviet Union but not its 
superpower status, and thus came to be sub-
jected to the “New World Order” charted by 
the ‘fortunate’ West.10  
In January 1992, a month after the official dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, US President, 
George H. W. Bush, announced in his State of 
the Union Address: “By the grace of God, Amer-
ica won the Cold War.” Bush asserted, “The 
Cold War didn’t ‘end’ – it was won.”11 On the 
                                                          
9 
Martin McCauley, "The Gorbachev Era." Ency-
clopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, Chica-
go: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014.   
10 
See Dewdney, John C.; Pipes, Richard E.; Conquest, 
Robert; McCauley, Martin, "Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics." Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Ref-
erence Suite. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2014. See also Nogee, Joseph L.; Donaldson, Robert 
H. Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II. New 
York, Pergamon Press, 1992; Engelmann, Kurt E.; 
Lincoln, W. Bruce; Parrott, Bruce; Lieven, Dominic, 
"Russia." Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, 
WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008).   
11 
George H. W. Bush, President of United States of 
America, State of the Union Address, 28 January 
end of the Cold War, Russian officials, however, 
have not made so clear a statement about what 
exactly happened from their point of view. Ac-
cording to Fyodor Lukyanov, Their assessments 
have ranged from “we won” affirming the Rus-
sian people overcame a repressive communist 
system to “we lost” indicating that the Russians 
allowed a great country to collapse.12 Neverthe-
less, leaders of the New Russia have all agreed 
on one thing: the “New World Order” that 
emerged after 1991 was nothing like the one 
envisioned by Mikhail Gorbachev and other 
reform-minded Soviet leaders as a way to pre-
vent the worst possible outcomes of the Cold 
War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
rendered Gorbachev’s paradigm obsolete. A 
“New World Order” no longer meant an ar-
rangement between equals; it meant the tri-
umph of Western principles and influence.13 
The US-led 1990 – 1991 Gulf War introduced a 
new dynamic: without the constraints of super-
power rivalry, the Western powers seemed to 
feel emboldened to use direct military interven-
tion to put pressure on states that resisted the 
new order, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Thus, the New Russia entered into the new 
world order prepared to battle for relevance 
and assume eventually the exited status of the 
defunct USSR as a superpower in world affairs.  
2. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA: 
OBJECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES 
The foreign policy of the New Russia at incep-
tion was influenced by some long-term inter-
ests, such as the desire to establish Russia as a 
democratic, free state in the post-totalitarian 
era, provide favourable conditions for the for-
mation of a modern efficient economy, ensure 
the state’s financial and economic independ-
ence and achieve the equal and natural incor-
                                                                                       
1992, 
http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/sp
eech-5531 (accessed 20 June 2016). 
12
 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The 
Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign 
Affairs, 95/3, 2016, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-
fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for... (accessed 23 June 
2016). 
13 
See Thorun, Christian, Explaining Change in Rus-
sian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet 
Russia’s Conduct towards the West. Great Britain, 
Palgrave McMillan, 2009, 9: McFaul, “What are Rus-
sian Foreign Policy Objectives?”  
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poration of the Russian Federation into the 
world community as a great power that boasts 
a centuries-long history, unique geopolitical 
situation, considerable military might, and sig-
nificant technological, intellectual and ethical 
capacities.14 These long-term interests formed 
the basis for the foreign policy objectives sub-
sequently pursued by the New Russia from 
1991 and shaped the pattern of her engage-
ment in the international system up to present 
day.  
In the last two and half decades of the engage-
ment of post-soviet Russia in international rela-
tions, a pattern observable in her foreign policy 
thrust and behaviour in the international sys-
tem indicate a complexity. At one point, her 
foreign policy thrust has been largely pro-
Western, and at another, it assumes an anti-
Western posture, although not to the extreme 
as to engender the fear of a global war. In fact, 
the foreign policy pursuits of the New Russian 
from 1993 espoused both characteristics, a 
syncretic foreign policy posture that blended 
pro-Western interests with an anti-Western 
stance to reflect the influences of the various 
schools of thought and interest groups that had 
continued to influence and shape Russia’s be-
haviour in world affairs.  
Although it was well recognised at the inception 
of the state that it was vital the New Russia’s 
foreign policy be guided not by ideological 
stances or parties’ needs, but by fundamental 
national interests, her foreign policy from 1991 
has been a product of ideologies and group 
interests that are superimposed as national 
interests. However, all the leaders of the New 
Russia since 1991, from Boris N. Yeltsin to Vla-
dimir Putin, share in supporting a few common, 
general foreign policy objectives, and disagree 
on many other. In general, there is a consensus 
that Russia’s first foreign policy objective must 
be to reverse her internal decline and estab-
lished a firm control of its borders, as it is im-
possible for the New Russia to be a major inter-
national actor with a shrinking economy. This 
well-known fact underlies the foreign policy of 
the New Russia, but how the achievement of 
this goal was being pursued is what influences 
                                                          
14 
Melville; Shakleina (eds.), Russian Foreign Policy in 
Transition, 27. 
the pattern and character of the foreign policy 
of the state.15  
In the same vein, there is a unanimous position 
on the fact that Russia must pursue economic 
political and military cooperation within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia’s 
foreign policy elites remain resolute on estab-
lishing a Russian sphere of influence within the 
region. To achieve this, Russia must pursue as a 
foreign policy goal the promotion of greater 
cooperation within the Commonwealth that 
comprises eleven of the former fifteen soviet 
republics. This position and the first policy on 
the economy and territorial integrity of the 
federation are the major domestic determinant 
of the Russian foreign policy.16 In addition to 
the pursuit of Russia’s economic revival and 
avoiding further disintegration of the federa-
tion, and the need to carve out a sphere of in-
fluence for the New Russia, leaders of the state 
also agree that the maintenance of Russia’s 
nuclear superpower status is key to retaining 
global relevance and retaking Russia’s rightful 
place in international affairs. According to 
McFaul, “Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpile is 
the one power attribute that still accords Russia 
special status in the international system.”17  
This set of objectives shape Russian foreign 
policy behaviour and influences Russian foreign 
policy response to other international issues in 
general and predictable manner. Russia’s tacit 
support for the control of international oil at 
the turn of the millennium, which resulted in 
the raising of oil prices, increased hard currency 
revenues for Russian oil companies and the 
Russian government, was largely influence by 
her internal economic problem. It was also be-
cause of Russia’s desire to maintain the Com-
monwealth of Independence States as its 
sphere of influence that Russia does not sup-
port the deployment of American troops in 
Azerbaijan and fears further NATO expansion 
towards its borders. Generally, on issues like 
this, Russia’s foreign policy thrust has followed 
                                                          
15 
See McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy 
Objectives?”” 
16 
Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign 
Policy, 28 – 46: McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign 
Policy Objectives?””  
17 
Ibid. 
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a discernible pattern – Russia’s national inter-
ests.18 
A major influence on the changing pattern of 
the foreign policy of the New Russia has been 
the influence of the different school of thought 
in Russia’s external relations, which determines 
the behaviour of the Russia in the international 
system at any given time. Essentially, the school 
of thought to which a leader belongs usually 
dominates how Russia would pursue her inter-
ests in the international system as well as re-
spond to international issues within the system. 
Majorly, scholars have identified the various 
perspectives represented by these schools of 
thought. According to McFaul, there are four 
schools of thought in Russian foreign policy, 
namely the Pro-Western Idealists, the Pro-
Western Pragmatists, the Anti-Western Prag-
matists and the Anti-Western Ideologues.19  
Russia’s foreign policy in the early years of the 
post-Soviet era was largely influenced by the 
pro-Western Idealists. The Pro-Western Ideal-
ists support ideas about democracy, the mar-
ket, self-determination and integration with the 
Western capitalist system. This is clearly oppos-
ing and adversative to the ideas pursued by the 
soviet ancien regime. A key figure in the emer-
gence of the New Russia in 1991 was the Rus-
sian leader Boris Yeltsin, who subsequently was 
elected president of the federation. Boris Yelt-
sin and his government were guided by this set 
of liberal ideas that included in foreign policy 
matters a distinctly pro-Western and peaceful 
foreign policy. After independence in 1991, 
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and President 
Boris Yeltsin, at first, maintained a strongly pro-
American foreign policy. Yeltsin and Kozyrev 
initially had a relaxed attitude toward the east-
ward expansion of NATO, which had been the 
main military alliance of Western nations during 
the Cold War.20  
Boris Yeltsin’s pro-Western stance was not un-
expected giving his struggles against soviet 
communism and the support he received from 
                                                          
18 
Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet 
Era, 38 – 40. 
19 
McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objec-
tives?” 
20 
Lieven, Dominic, "Government of Russia." Micro-
soft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Microsoft 
Corporation, 2008). 
democratic forces in the Baltic, Caucuses and 
Ukraine, which resulted eventually in the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union. The pro-Western 
Idealists as a group only have a normative 
commitment to Western values and Western 
integration; they were not being driven merely 
by self-interest.21 Although the advocates of 
this liberal approach are in the minority, it 
formed the major influence on Russia foreign 
policy in the early part of the Yeltsin leadership. 
Andrei Kozyrev, the first Russian foreign minis-
ter directed the affairs of Russia’s external rela-
tions along this line until his dismissal in 1996.  
By the end of the first year of independence, 
the impetus for a pro-Western foreign policy 
had started to fade off, as Russian’s expecta-
tions concerning Western assistance were not 
met. The euphoria for democracy and the 
Western ways gradually became unpopular, 
and government foreign policy appeared to be 
drifting back to more anti-Western patterns of 
the soviet era. The pro-Western pragmatists 
drove the movement that reinvigorated the 
support for maintaining a pro-Western orienta-
tion in foreign po-licy pursuit of the Russian 
state. 
These movements include groups with tangible 
economic interests in cooperative relations 
with Western countries, such as Gazprom, oil 
companies, mi-neral exporters, technology 
companies and the bankers, some Russian gov-
ernors of Russian provinces, especially Titov of 
Samara and Prusak of Novgorod in northwest-
ern Russia as well as Shaimiev in Tatarstan 
along with hundreds of  non-governmental 
organisations supported a cooperative relation-
ship with the West because of their stake, and a 
majority of public opinion.22 Thus, the pro-
Western orientation of the Russian foreign poli-
cy was retained as these various movement 
gradually replaced groups with political ideas as 
the main societal forces influencing foreign 
                                                          
21 
McFaul, Michael, “What are Russian Foreign Policy 
Objectives?”; See also the analysis of Russian foreign 
policy in the immediate post-Soviet era in Mankoff, 
Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great 
Power Politics, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Pub-
lishers, Inc., 2009, 53 – 54; Fawn, Rick (ed.), Rea-
lignments in Russian Foreign Policy, London, Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2003, 10 – 14.  
22 
McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objec-
tives?” 
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policy outcomes in Russia. For instance, the 
Russian business lobby, although has a rather 
limited scope of foreign policy interests, seek to 
maintain access to Western investment capital 
and markets. Thus, when security issues, such 
as opposition to NATO expansion threaten 
these access interests, the coalition of liberals 
within the Russian within the Russian govern-
ment and their allies in Russia’s economic socie-
ty cooperated to sustain engagement.23        
The anti-Western pragmatists and ideologues 
are the other forces that influence foreign poli-
cy debates in Russia. While the pragmatists 
attempt to define Russian foreign policy objec-
tives in terms of interests rather than ideas, 
norms or mission, the ideologues are passion-
ately anti-Western and sees international rela-
tions as primarily a balance of power battle 
between Russia and the West. Both do not 
think that Russia stands to gain from a pro-
Western foreign policy or Western integration 
more generally. Rather than see a Russian rela-
tions with the West as a “win-win,” they per-
ceive it as a “zero-sum game.” Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov, Moscow Mayor Yurii Lu-
zhkov, General Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky are some notable proponent of 
anti-Western foreign policy orientation and 
influenced the course of Russian foreign policy 
significantly till present day.24     
3. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA: 
OBSERVABLE PATTERN AND TREND FROM 
1991 
A key figure in the emergence of the New Rus-
sia was the Russian leader Boris Yeltsin, who 
subsequently was elected president of the fed-
eration in 1991. After independence in 1991, 
the Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin at first maintained a strongly 
pro-American foreign policy. Yeltsin and 
Kozyrev initially had a relaxed attitude toward 
the eastward expansion of NATO, which had 
been the main military alliance of Western na-
tions during the Cold War.25 
                                                          
23 
Ibid. 
24 
Ibid. 
25 
Lieven, Dominic "Government of Russia." Mi-
crosoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Mi-
crosoft Corporation, 2008); Zimmerman, William, 
The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite 
However, soon domestic pressure prompted a 
foreign policy shift. The Soviet Union was a 
superpower and possessed a very different 
social and economic system from that in the 
West. This appealed to the pride of many Rus-
sians and helped erase a traditional sense of 
inferiority to the West. In 1991, quite suddenly 
and unexpectedly for most Russians, the USSR 
ceased to exist and Russia lost much of its in-
ternational power and status. In the 1990s, 
Russia was forced to ask the West for economic 
assistance and investment. The pro-American 
foreign policy of President Yeltsin and his for-
eign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, quickly found 
considerable opposition. The opposition in-
creased when Russia did not receive the mas-
sive Western financial assistance that many 
Russians had naively expected.26  
In particular, strong support for the ultrana-
tionalist candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, in the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections con-
vinced the government that the public de-
manded a more nationalistic, less pro-Western 
approach to foreign policy. As a result, Russia 
resumed sales of arms and civil nuclear tech-
nology to developing countries, including Iran, 
which elicited disapproval from the United 
States. More importantly, Russia began ex-
pressing loud support for Russians in the “near 
abroad” (as Russians refer to the outlying areas 
of the former USSR) and strong opposition to 
NATO expansion, and was at odds with NATO 
countries over how to resolve the ethnic tur-
moil in the former Yugoslavia. NATO’s support 
for Muslims and Croats drew disapproval from 
Russia, which had historical ties to the compet-
ing ethnic Serbs. 27 
Much of this shift in policy was more a question 
of rhetoric than one of practice, however. By 
1997, Russia’s support for Russian-speaking 
secessionists in the Trans-Dniester region of 
Moldova had become more moderate. The 
Russian government never encouraged Russian 
secessionists in Crimea; their strength in 1993 
and 1994 threatened both political stability in 
Ukraine and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In 
                                                                                       
and Mass Perspective, 1993 – 2000. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2002, 88 – 89.  
26 
See Lieven, Dominic, "History of Russia." Microsoft 
Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Cor-
poration, 2008).   
27 
Lieven, "Government of Russia.” 
Sunday Ariyo Aboyade The changing pattern of the foreign policy 
 
80 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 
1997, the New Russia signed a friendship treaty 
with Ukraine, settling the long-standing dispute 
over the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and confirming 
its recognition of Ukraine’s post-independence 
borders. 28 
There were multiple reasons for Russia’s re-
straint. The country was conscious of its eco-
nomic and military weakness, and it was also 
aware of the potential for conflict within the 
former USSR if national borders were chal-
lenged or ethnic conflicts encouraged. Fur-
thermore, Yeltsin recognized that Russia need-
ed to integrate itself into the world economy 
and Western-dominated institutions, such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), if it was 
to regain economic prosperity and effective 
global influence. Russia’s long-running dispute 
with Japan over the Kuril Islands also reduced 
the country’s room to manoeuvre in interna-
tional affairs.29 
However, American determination to incorpo-
rate many former Soviet satellite states into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an-
gered the Russian political elite. Because 
NATO’s essential purpose had been to serve as 
an anti-Soviet alliance, the political elite felt it 
was insulting when the former satellites were 
invited to join. They also resented being ex-
cluded from the dominant military and political 
bloc in Europe, which seemed intent on extend-
ing its membership right up to Russia’s borders. 
Under Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Rus-
sia became more critical of United States poli-
cies and began to rebuild political ties to China 
and some of its old allies in the Middle East. 
Even as Russia fostered these ties, the Russian 
government recognized its own weakness and 
its need for positive relations with the West. 
This knowledge prevented Russia from going 
too far for fear of isolating itself from Western 
nations. In the Soviet era international isolation 
and the attempt to develop a powerful self-
sufficient economy had failed disastrously. Yelt-
sin’s regime understood this and was commit-
ted to full participation in the world economy 
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and international trade. These things could only 
be achieved on the West’s terms. 30 
In 1999, the New Russia’s relations with West-
ern nations suddenly worsened as NATO admit-
ted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
thus expanding into Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, and also attacked Yugoslavia to compel 
the Yugoslav government to halt military opera-
tions against Albanian separatists in the Kosovo 
province. This NATO eastward expansion, main-
ly by absorbing countries that had previously 
formed a buffer zone around Russia elicited 
reaction from Kremlin. For centuries, Russian 
security strategy has been built on defence: 
expanding the space around the core to avoid 
being caught off-guard. As a country of plains, 
Russia has experienced devastating invasions 
more than once; the New Russia, thus, has long 
seen reinforcing “strategic depth” as the only 
way to guarantee its survival.31 Consequently, 
Russia denounced NATO as aggressive and ex-
pansionist and drew closer to China. However, 
Russian policymakers understood their own 
country’s weakness and its need to attract 
Western investment. The government’s rheto-
ric at times reflected the increasingly nationalist 
mood in Russian society, but its foreign policy 
remained cautious.32  
The resumed antagonism against Western ac-
tions by the New Russia in international affairs 
became more noticeable towards the close of 
the century and was borne out of the need to 
check Western arrogance and its expansion into 
former soviet space. Despite being cautious of 
its foreign policy action, the New Russia 
demonstrated its resentment of the actions of 
the West in international affairs, especially the 
aggression of the United States, NATO and the 
European Union. To the Russian, the West mis-
interpreted Russia’s inaction. As Ivan Krastev 
and Mark Leonard observed in their 2014 publi-
cation, “The New European Disorder,” Western 
powers “mistook Moscow’s failure to block the 
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post-Cold War order as support for it.”33 Begin-
ning in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
repeatedly expressed deep dissatisfaction with 
what he and many Russians saw as Western 
arrogance. However, according to Fyodor Luky-
anov, “Washington viewed such criticism from 
Russia as little more than a reflexive expression 
of an outmoded imperial mentality, mostly 
intended for domestic consumption.”34  
From the Russian point of view, a critical turn-
ing point in Russian relations with the West at 
the close of the century came when NATO in-
tervened in the Kosovo war in 1999. Many Rus-
sians including strong advocates of liberal re-
form were appalled by NATO’s bombing raids 
against Serbia, a European country with close 
ties to Moscow, which were intended to force 
the Serbs to capitulate in their fight against 
Kosovar separatists. The success of that effort, 
which also led directly to the downfall of the 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic the following 
year seemed to set a new precedent and pro-
vide a new template for Russo-Western rela-
tions in world affairs. Since 2001, NATO or its 
leading member states have initiated military 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. All 
three campaigns led to various forms of regime 
change and, in the case of Iraq and Libya, the 
deterioration of the state. In this sense, it is not 
only NATO’s expansion that has alarmed Russia 
but also NATO’s transformation, a purely de-
fensive alliance now a fighting group, which it 
was not during the Cold War.35 
At the turn of the century, however, Russia’s 
leaders continued cautious foreign policy rela-
tions with the West; relatively cooperative and 
unpretentious in opposing Western oversteps. 
Kremlin criticised, opposed Western actions 
when it threatens Russia’s interest and cooper-
ated with the West on issues of common inter-
ests. Essentially, however, Kremlin was anxious 
to maintain good relations with the Western 
powers. President Vladimir Putin pursued a 
foreign policy of closer cooperation with the 
West. Following terrorist attacks in the United 
States in September 2001, the New Russia be-
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came a key ally in the US-led war on terrorism. 
In May 2002, the New Russia and the United 
States reached their first arms-reduction treaty 
in more than a decade. In addition, that month, 
the New Russia became a limited partner in 
NATO. In November 2002, Russia did not object 
when NATO announced a further expansion to 
include several more nations in Eastern Europe, 
among them the former Soviet republics of 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.36 However, Russia 
was critical of the United States over its inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. Russia joined with Germa-
ny and France in the United Nations (UN) Secu-
rity Council in proposing that UN weapons in-
spectors were given more time to search for the 
alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 
And giving the strategic relationship of the New 
Russia with countries of the Middle East, it 
simply refused to join the invasion force that 
the United States and Britain assembled.37  
As the United States flexed its muscles and 
NATO became a more formidable organization, 
Russia found itself in a strange position. Russia 
was offered a limited niche inside Europe’s 
expanding architecture. Western leaders as-
sumed that Russia would respond to its eco-
nomic predicament by becoming part of what 
can be referred to as “wider Europe”: a theoret-
ical space that featured the EU and NATO at its 
core but that also incorporated countries that 
were not members of those organisations by 
encouraging them to adopt voluntarily the 
norms and regulations associated with mem-
bership. This was unlike Gorbachev’s concept of 
a common European home where the Soviet 
Union would be a co-designer of a new world 
order, Moscow instead had to give up its global 
aspirations and agree to obey rules it had 
played no part in devising.38 President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, in 2002 
made it clear to Kremlin that Russia would 
share with the EU “everything but institu-
tions.”39 In plain terms, this meant that Russia 
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would adopt EU rules and regulations but 
would not be able to influence their develop-
ment. This was suffocating for Russia, who must 
respond to this disregard.  
For quite a while, Moscow essentially accepted 
this proposition, making only minimal efforts to 
expand its global role. However, neither Russian 
elites nor ordinary Russians ever accepted the 
image of their country as a mere regional pow-
er. The early years of the Vladimir Putin era saw 
the recovery of the Russian economy with a 
consequent increase in Russia’s international 
influence. Suddenly, Russia was no longer a 
supplicant; it was a critical emerging market 
and an engine of global growth.40 What is more, 
although the West was experiencing growing 
difficulties steering its own course economically 
in the first decade of the millenium, it never lost 
its desire to expand, pressuring Ukraine, for 
example, to align itself more closely with the 
EU. At this point, the Russian foreign policy to 
keep the West at arm’s length became more 
pronounce. The New Russia, thus, came to the 
conclusion, as the Russian political scientist, 
Sergei Karaganov, put it in 2011 “that Western 
expansionism could be reversed only with an 
“iron fist.”41 
The “iron fist” was evident in Russia’s response 
to Western incursion into its sphere of influ-
ence during the 2014 Crimean Crisis. The Feb-
ruary 2014 ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych by pro-Western forces was, in a 
sense, the final straw for Russia. Moscow’s op-
eration in Crimea was a response to the EU’s 
and NATO’s persistent eastward expansion 
during the post–Cold War period. Moscow re-
jected the further extension of Western influ-
ence into the former Soviet space in the most 
decisive way possible with the use of military 
force. The Kremlin is now, more than before, 
resolute in order to defend its interests close to 
Russia’s borders, it must play globally. 
Therefore, having drawn a line in Ukraine, Rus-
sia decided that the next place to put down the 
iron fist would be Syria. The Syrian intervention 
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was aimed not only at strengthening Assad’s 
position but also at forcing the United States to 
deal with Moscow on a more equal footing. The 
cease-fire eventually arrived at in 2013 alt-
hough represents an unexpected cooperation 
on the Syrian crisis, where the civil war has pit-
ted Moscow, which acts as the primary protec-
tor and patron of Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad, against Washington, which has called for 
an end to Assad’s rule.42 
If anything at all, what the unexpected coopera-
tion between the Russia and the US highlight is 
the fact that, although the world order has 
changed beyond recognition during the past 
two and a half decades and is no longer defined 
by a rivalry between two competing superpow-
ers, it remains the case that when an acute 
international crisis breaks out, Russia and the 
United States are often the only actors able to 
resolve it.43 Rising powers, international institu-
tions, and regional organizations frequently 
cannot do anything, or do not want to. What is 
more, despite Moscow’s and Washington’s 
expressions of hostility and contempt for each 
other, when it comes to shared interests and 
common threats, the two powers are still able 
to work reasonably well together. This trend is 
very visible in the Putin Russia’s foreign policy. 
However, it is important to note that these 
types of constructive interactions on discrete 
issues have not changed the overall relation-
ship, which remains troubled.44 Even as it 
worked with Russia on the truce, the United 
States continued to enforce the sanctions it had 
placed on Russia in response to the 2014 an-
nexation of Crimea.  
With the ascendance of Russian foreign policy 
and its ability to project the interests of Russia 
globally as global power, it marks the attain-
ment of the long-sought status of the New Rus-
sian Federation. As Fyodor Lukyanov observed,  
“the era of bipolar confrontation ended a 
long time ago. Nevertheless, the unipolar 
moment of US dominance that began in 
1991 is gone, too. A new, multipolar world 
has brought more uncertainty into interna-
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tional affairs. Both Russia and the United 
States are struggling to define their proper 
roles in the world”.45  
This assertion affirms the global relevance of 
the New Russia in the strategic calculation of 
the West. No longer can the West solely super-
intend issues in the international system un-
checked. Whereas the condition of relations has 
not returned the world to a bipolar system of 
the soviet era, it has established the New Russia 
as a global power in the current multipolar sys-
tem.  
CONCLUSION 
The changing pattern of the foreign policy of 
the New Russia that emerged from the ruin of 
the Soviet Union and the nature of its relations 
with Africa since 1991 has been considered in 
the foregoing. A noticeable trend in the foreign 
policy of the New Russia from the emergence of 
the state in 1991 is that its conception and im-
plementation is greatly influenced by national 
interests as well as the interests of different 
stakeholders in the nation’s external relations. 
It is these interests and the varied ways in 
which different schools of thoughts believe the 
foreign policy goals of the state could be 
achieved that has influenced the changing pat-
tern of the New Russia from inception to date. 
A historical examination of the behaviour of the 
New Russia in international affairs showed that 
Russia’s foreign policy hovered between pro-
Western orientations to anti-Western stance.  
Nevertheless, the domestic determinants of the 
foreign policy of the New Russia and the Rus-
sian people’s belief in the superpower status of 
their state as a successor to the defunct Soviet 
Union necessitated the blend of both pro-
Western and anti-Western orientation of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy behaviour and response in 
world politics. For instance, the need to mod-
ernise and strengthen the inefficient economy 
of the Russian state necessitated a pro-Western 
posture in her relations within the western-led 
international economic order. A cooperative 
relationship with the West was necessary at 
inception and even at present to strengthen the 
weak economy of Russia.  
On the other hand, the need to keep the Com-
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monwealth of Independence States as the 
sphere of influence of the Russian Federation 
has necessitated the anti-Western thrust of the 
foreign policy at some point, especially from 
1993 when NATO began to expand its influence 
into former soviet space, a development con-
sidered as security threat to Russia and her 
interest within the region. Similar behaviour has 
characterise the New Russia’s response to the 
continued expansion of the European Union 
into former Soviet republics since the turn of 
the century.  
The desire of the Russians to be accorded due 
respect in the western-led international order 
also encouraged passionate Russian nationals 
to favour an anti-Western foreign policy against 
what the Russian’s called “Western arrogance.” 
The stockpile of nuclear weaponry at the dis-
posal of the Federation particularly conferred a 
special status on Russia, at least the West 
would necessarily reckon with Russia in inten-
tional political matters. This soviet inheritance 
has made Russia confident enough in the inter-
national system to challenge the superpower 
status of the United States of America in major 
international relations matters. Russia had con-
tinued to be a check on the powers of the Unit-
ed States in world politics. Russia’s role during 
the Iranian nuclear saga significantly influenced 
the outcome of the deal eventually arrived at. 
Russia’s influence is equally significant in any 
possible resolution of the Syrian crises that had 
crippled the state since the Arab spring.  
Russia’s resolute stance on the recent Crimean 
crisis with Ukraine as well as its defiance to 
international sentiments for Ukraine also un-
derline that although the New Russia may not 
be an economic power like the United States or 
China, its rival in the East Asian space, its formi-
dable military strength and the sophistication of 
its military technology has made her a rival to 
the global power and a power centre in world 
politics. This understanding of its strength and 
weaknesses in relations to other powers in the 
international system has therefore necessitated 
some compromise in form of partnership with 
Western countries on many strategic issues in 
world affairs. In fact, the continued partnership 
with NATO and the United States is a case in 
point.  
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